Trends of fiscal centralization: Portuguese local government reform by Rodrigues, Miguel & Costa, Cláudia S.
UrbanAffairsAssociation42ndAnnualConference
RethinkingtheFutureofUrbanism:CitiesandRegionsinaPostͲIndustrialEra
April18–21,2012|WyndhamGrandPittsburghDowntown|Pittsburgh,PA

BookofAbstracts

Page51of293
Lastupdate:4/8/2012
TheNextGenerationofLowͲIncomeHomeOwnersinStrugglingUrban
Neighborhoods
DanCooper(VanderbiltUniversity)
Presenter’sEmailAddress:dan.g.cooper@gmail.com
Thispaperexploreshowthefinancialcrisishasaffectedexperiencesandideasaboutcommunityamong
aspiringlowͲincomehomeowners.Itlooksathowdifferentlevelsofneighborhooddeclineimpactsocial
networksandneighborhoodconfidence.UtilizingsurveydatacollectedfromparticipantsoflowͲincome
homebuyereducationworkshops,andsecondaryneighborhooddata,thepaperexaminestherelative
influenceofneighborhoodandpsychoͲsocialvariablesonfuturepurchaseaspirations.Itseeksto
explorehowurbanneighborhooddeclinemightbetransformingfuturegeographiesoflowͲincome
homeownership.Thefocusonaspiringhomeownersprovidesnewinsightintothefutureviabilityof
homeownershipandcommunityinstrugglingneighborhoods,andtellsamorecomplexstoryof
vulnerablehousingnichesindecliningurbanareas.
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ThecrisisofthesovereigndebtforcedPortuguesegovernmenttoreachoutforjointfinancialhelpform
theIMF(InternationalMonetaryFund),EU(EuropeanUnion)andECB(EuropeanCentralBank).Inthe
financialagreementterms,IMF/EU/ECBstressedtheneedofamajorredefinitionofthelocal
governmentorganization.Nowadays,Portugueselocalgovernmentisstructuredin308municipalities
and4259parishesbothwithelectedofficialsandadministrative,financialandpatrimonialautonomy.
So,Portuguesegovernmentwasaskedtodeliveraconsolidationplantoreorganizelocalentities
enhancingservicedelivery,improveefficiencyandreducecost.Themainargumentusedisthat
excessiveterritorialandfiscalfragmentationunderminesefficiency.Thisresearchseekstomeasurethe
impactofterritorialandfiscalfragmentationinlocalgovernmentspending.Webeginbylookinginto
Tiebout's(1956)argumentthatanoptimalleveloflocalexpenditurescanbedefinedbasedona
consumerͲvoterpreferencetowardspublicgoodsandtaxation.Thanwebalancewiththeopposite
argument,usedbyinternationalagencies,that,boughtterritorialandfiscal,centralizationcanproduce
economiesofscale,reduceoverlaps,controlfreeridersandpromotebetteraccountability(Hendricket
al.2011).Themainobjectiveofthepaperistotestthecompetitivehypothesisthat
fragmentation/centralizationinduceshigherspendinginlocalgovernment.Totestthishypothesiswe
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useaquantitativeapproachcollectingprimaryfinancialdataassembledfromallPortugueselocal
government.Wedefinedasadependentvariable,thelevelofexpenditurespercapitaineachlocal
government.Then,weusethesizeofthelocalgovernment,thenumberofparisheswithineachlocal
government,thestandarddeviationofrevenues,asindicatorstomeasureterritorialandfiscal
fragmentation.
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Anchorinstitutionshavelongbeentoutedfortheirpotentialtocatalyzeandcreateopportunitiesfor
spinͲoffdevelopmentinsurroundingcommunities(FulbrightͲAnderson,Auspos,andAnderson,2001;
InitiativeforaCompetitiveInnerCity,2010;Rodin,2007).Severalscholarshaveexaminedthewaysin
whichmilitaryinstallations,governmentagencies,andotherfederalentitieshavecontributedtothe
emergenceofinnovativeregionaleconomies(Accordino,2000;Markusen,Hall,Campbell,&Deitrick,
1991).Littleisknown,however,abouttheuniquerolethatanchorinstitutionsplayincapitalcities.
Capitalcitiesplayanimportantroleinshapinganation’scultural,socialandpoliticalidentityandthe
literaturehasextensivelyexaminedtheirroleascentersofpoliticalpower.Moststudiesofcapitalcities
focusontheirhistoricalevolution,urbanmorphologyandrepresentationofpower,andtheirpositionin
thenationalurbansystem(Gordon,2006).Thereis,however,alackofunderstandingofcapitalcitiesas
economicsystemsandparticularlythewaysinwhichthefederalandthelocalcommunitiesinteractand
howfederalagenciesmayormaynotplayaroleinanchoringcommunityeconomies.Thispaperdraws
onrecentworkrelatedtoanemergingopportunitysurroundinganewDepartmentofHomeland
SecurityfacilityonWashington,DC’sSt.Elizabethscampus,oneofthemostunderservedcommunities
intheregion.AspartofalargerstudyoftheinnovationclusterpotentialinsoutheasternDC,we
explorehowlocalandfederalleadersmaybetterincorporatethesurroundingcommunityinthe
developmentprocessandfostersustainedandmutuallybeneficialrelationshipsthereafter.
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The crisis of the sovereign debt forced Portuguese government to reach out for joint financial help form the 
IMF (International Monetary Fund), EU (European Union) and ECB (European Central Bank). In the 
financial agreement terms, IMF/EU/ECB stressed the need of a major redefinition of the local government 
organization. Nowadays, Portuguese local government is structured in 308 municipalities and 4259 
parishes both with elected officials and administrative, financial and patrimonial autonomy. So, 
Portuguese government was asked to present a consolidation plan to reorganize local entities enhancing 
service delivery, improve efficiency and reduce cost.  The main argument used is that excessive territorial 
and fiscal fragmentation undermines efficiency. 
 
This research seeks to measure the impact of territorial and fiscal fragmentation in local government 
spending. We begin by looking into Tiebout’s (1956) argument that an optimal level of local expenditures 
can be defined based on a consumer-voter preference towards public goods and taxation. Then we 
counterpoin with the opposite argument, used by international agencies, that, bought territorial and fiscal, 
centralization can produce economies of scale, reduce overlaps, control free riders and promote better 
accountability (Hendrick et al. 2011)  
 
The main objective of the paper is to test the competitive hypothesis that fragmentation/centralization 
induces higher spending in local government. To test this hypothesis we use a quantitative approach 
collecting primary financial data assembled from all Portuguese local government. We defined as a 
dependent variable, the amount of money transferred to parishes in each local government. Then, we use 
administrative fragmentation index in local government as indicators to measure territorial and population 
level of fragmentation. With the results of the paper, we hope to contribute to some clarification in the 
literature about fragmentation and federalist strategies to improve financial sustainability. 
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INDTROCUTION  
Most recent financial crises drove Portuguese government to reach out for help in order 
to solve sovereignty debt problem. One of the trends of reform agreed, between IMF 
(International Monetary Fund), EU (European Union) and ECB (European Central Bank) 
and Portuguese government was the need to challenge and modify local government 
institutions and organizations. Therefore, it was asked to elaborate a plan seeking 
territorial consolidation.1 Nowadays, while municipalities face a voluntary process of 
amalgamation, parishes are under pressure to accomplish a top-down reform. Parishes are 
the smallest level of government and the first access point of citizen to public authority.  
The guideline of reform argues that present territorial fragmentation damages 
local governments optimal level of expenditures. The aim of this paper is to analyze 
territorial fragmentation as a determinate of local government expenditures. A 
remarkable number of academics have examined the determinants of local spending. 
Classical argument of public choice theory argues that budgets and the level of 
expenditures are a result of political cycles that reflect rent-seeking strategies of 
politicians (Nordhaus 1975) and Niskanen (1968) perspective that bureaucratic budgetary 
decision are x-inefficient. More recent works argue that the structure, forms of 
democracy (Macdonald 2008; Carr & Karuppusamy 2010), political fragmentation and 
level of representation (Hajnal & Trounstine 2010; Feiock et al. 2009), civic participation 
(Gabrini 2010; Park et al. 2010), and the opportunistic behaviour of local actors that 
promote common-pool resources strategies (Weingast et al. 1981; Bradbury & 
Stephenson 2003; Elgie & McMenamin 2008).determine the size of local government 
expenditures. 
Our work focuses on local spending, mostly on how the fragmentation of 
municipalities into parishes affects the size of public expenditures. A lot of work has 
been looking at fragmentation as a determinant of municipal expenditures. In our work 
we seek to do a multi-level analysis. Parishes are a level of government that, in most of 
                                                            
1 Municipalities in Portugal are divided into lower levels of administration called parishes. Portugal has a 
total of 308 municipalities and 4259 parishes.  
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the cases, is highly dependent on financial resources granted by central government and 
municipalities. If the former is based on an established rule the latter depends on the 
several factors revealing more flexibility and on municipalities’ discretionary power. 
Only a few have enough capacity to ensure financial autonomy from the provision of 
public services. We argue that the level of fragmentation into parishes (lower-level) 
affects the size of municipal expenditures (higher-level). So, in a time when 
governments, central and local, face huge challenges to control and decrease their 
expenditures many doubts can be lifted whether to have a decentralized or consolidated 
system (Reuben et al. 1982). The choice for the kind of local government organization 
balance between these two main streams. One arguing with the need to keep actual 
administrative structure for the sake of civic engagement, choice, competition and 
accurate representation of citizen choice’s and preferences. The other, followed by 
IMF/EU/ECB, believing on the need to have a more centralized structure in order to 
avoid pork barrel decisions and overproduction of public services. Additionally, they 
stressed the need to improve cooperation and share utilities rather than territorial 
competition mostly because of the variation of population felt over the time. 
Several approaches can be drawn from fragmentation and, in each one, we can 
find arguments supporting the opposite ends of a consolidation-fragmentation spectrum. 
Territorial fragmentation is, at the same time, a very well- known and studied issue and 
it’s the “base camp” for other two forms of fragmentation: fiscal and political. For 
territorial fragmentation we use, on the one hand, Tiebout’s (1956) argument that it is 
possible, using market mechanisms of territorial competition, to determine an optimal 
level of public expenditures. On the other hand, territorial consolidation can avoid 
overlapping and duplicate services and produce economies of scale. Fiscal fragmentation 
or dispersed responsibilities and public resources uniformly distributed among local 
governments can also produce greater competition between local governments through 
Tiebout’s (1956) fiscal exit mechanism. The main arguments support the reduction of 
size of local governments. But on the contrary, a fragmented and dispersion structure of 
local governments could be less efficient and increase the size of those governments. 
Political fragmentation is also known as the theory of the weak government (Elgie, 
2008). It argues that the number of parties in government coalition or the political degree 
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of competition can increase the size of local government expenditures. However, absence 
of opposition can lead to an uncontrolled government leaving  all decisions in their hands 
and increasing expenditures. 
Using the argument that local level structural organization determines the size of 
the government, constitutional rules establish the type of territorial fragmentation that 
constrains fiscal options and political representation. Finally, we argue that the way that 
rules and structures are established – Institutions – determine politicians choices’, the 
way they interact, vote, ie, their political and economic behaviour and, in this particular 
case, levels of public spending. 
We gathered data from all 278 municipal jurisdictions in continental Portugal and 
we use OLS regression to measure how fragmentation can determine the local 
expenditures. Since we focus on local structures, namely on parishes analysis, we 
measure the size of the government by the amount of financial resources granted to 
parishes, by local government, and we use several measures of territorial, fiscal and 
political fragmentation as independent variables. We expect to find evidence that 
supports one of the two competing explications: that fragmentation promotes accurate 
levels of competition, corrects fund distribution and welfare, or that consolidation, 
achieving more economies of scale, is better suited to control municipal expenditures 
with parishes.  
We found evidence that support the fact that territorial fragmentation has an 
optimal level that minimizes municipal grant to parishes. We also found evidence that let 
us believe that fiscal fragmentation tends to increase local government spending. So we 
believe it is necessary to update fiscal and financial rules to better suit the competitive 
context of parishes.  
This paper is divided in four sections. In the first we introduce the context of 
Portuguese local government bases and the several approaches of fragmentation stating 
our hypotheses. Second we present the model of hypotheses, key concept and data 
sources. Thirdly, we present our empirical findings and, finally, we discuss the main 
conclusion of this investigation. 
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LOCAL GOVERNMENT FRAGMENTATIONS 
Portuguese constitution imposes that all territory must be divided in municipal 
jurisdictions and, the latter, in parishes (freguesias). Current administrative division has 
its origins in early XIX century and it’s linked with the Catholic Church own territorial 
division. Mostly on rural areas, people that were living in same place had the church as 
the only form for a community. Then they started to put together some effort in order to 
organize much needed common services. The creation of parishes was, therefore, 
recognition of already existing structures. 
 Nowadays, parishes have all structures democratically elected and have both 
executive and deliberative bodies. All parishes are treated as equal and they are classified 
in three different types only to financial grants purposes (in order to correct regional 
asymmetries). They have all the same competencies and in specific fields such as 
education (organization of services at kindergarten and elementary school level), wealth 
(infrastructures), welfare (elderly assistance, homeless, etc.) and other declarations and 
statements needed by citizens.  
However, present-day fiscal pressure stressed Portuguese government to promote 
financial cut-backs and the exiguity of parishes own revenues combined with a greater 
dependence on financial grants motivated the debate on the need to reshape the local 
organizational model of government. Fragmentation had become one major issue of 
interest and debate. IMF/EU/ECB understanding was that territorial consolidation was a 
way to follow to achieve the needed budget equilibrium of local governments and, at 
macro level, national financial stability.  
This is a well know and studied topic were we found several and opposite 
understandings and arguments on how fragmentation can affect the size of the 
municipalities. Looking further at the literature, and beginning with Tiebout’s (1956) 
approach, we can establish a continuum between fragmentation and consolidation of the 
territory. Tiebout’s understanding was based on the belief that local government 
competition while leading, ultimately, to efficiency and that citizens’ choice for any 
jurisdiction reflects, in fact, a choice for a package of public services and fiscal burden. 
Besides being important in the structural organization, territorial fragmentation defines, 
 6 
in our opinion, two other major types of fragmentation: fiscal and political. As we said, 
following previous argument, the degree in which the territory is divided, that is, the 
municipal jurisdiction is fragmented into parishes, determines the level of competition of 
the same jurisdiction. Being coherent with Tiebout’s arguments, higher competition will 
lead to lower production cost avoiding x-inefficient situations of monopolies (Weimer & 
Vining 2010). Finally, territorial fragmentation leads to an increasing number of parishes 
democratically elected which increase the accuracy of constituents’ preferences. By all 
this, one can say that fragmentation enforces competition, efficiency and 
representativeness. However, a lot of imperfections can be pointed out to this 
fragmentation concept. Consolidation position argues that fragmentation leads to 
overlapping services, budget maximization and weak government perception. The same 
stream argues that amalgamation and fiscal consolidation drive parishes away from a 
dangerous situation were their excessive financial dependency could make them 
administrative extensions of the administrative machinery without any regard for their 
constituency preferences. Additionally it solves the problem of geographical scarcity and 
the potential limitation to service delivery due to constrains in the ability to lower average 
costs through economies of scale. Consolidation allows size increase that enables the 
reduction of unit costs and thereby makes possible the production and promotion of 
supplementary goods and services to the population.  
In this paper we seek to analyze whether fragmentation drives, or not, to higher 
spending. 
 
Territorial Fragmentation 
Tibeout (1956) sought to understand what motivated the optimal level of public local 
spending. Analysing the classical problem of overproduction of public goods, Tibeout 
realizes that it was very difficult to force the consumer-voter to state his true preferences 
and, additionally, that they will rationally opt for a rent-seeking free ride strategy where 
consumers hope to enjoy goods avoiding any taxation. In this situation, local spending is 
expected to be higher and local governments found themselves powerless to counter this 
situation. Given these problems, the purposed model of government needed to cover three 
major situations: to force consumer-voter to reveal its preferences; local government 
 7 
ability to satisfy them; and consumers to be taxed accordingly. Territorial fragmentation 
was argued to be a mechanism to accomplish the stated objectives. Fragmentation 
induces competition since local governments are viewed as jurisdiction, financially 
bounded, with a combination of public goods/fiscal burden that better suits the 
preferences of the citizens that each is trying to capture. 
Basically Tiebout’s model is based on the assumption that people are permanently 
looking to evaluate alternatives that might better satisfy their sets of preferences and that 
local governments are competing for the wealthiest and manage tax mobility to improve 
their tax base (Reuben et al. 1982). 
Tiebout’s work leads to what is known as the Leviathan hypotheses (Brennan & 
Buchanan James 1977; Park et al. 2010). The idea is centred on the assumption that 
decentralized government encourages competition and lowers public spending. 
Furthermore, Some work found evidence to support the leviathan hypotheses that 
fragmentation leads to less expense (Schneider 1989) 
However, some downside can be pointed out to this approach. Some linked with 
its assumptions, other with its accuracy to explain mobility and lastly a different view 
that argues precisely the need of territorial consolidation.  
This model has some specification that can be found hard to comply with. Firstly, 
the model assumes the mobility of voters. This is the ability and motivation of moving 
through the territory seeking to better satisfaction. The rigidity of the labor market, as 
well as their own regional variations, precludes the accurate fulfilment of this 
proposition. Secondly, there should be perfect information available so that citizens could 
evaluate the alternatives and realize the choices that best serve their interests. The third 
assumption is that there is an optimal size, in terms of population, for each territorial unit. 
As such, local elected officials consciously act to promote the increase, or decrease in 
population within their jurisdiction. 
Besides these remarks, linked to the internal coherence of the model, Bickers et. 
al (Bickers et al. 2006) challenged the own bias of the Tiebout’s approach. The authors 
found alternative explanationscation to the mobility of consumers-voter. Social capita, 
sense of community, ethnics and level of income are to be considered as important 
determinants of the mobility between jurisdiction. 
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 Territorial fragmentation can be accused to lead to confusion, political 
unresponsiveness, duplication of effort, inefficiencies in services provision, large 
government outlays and units of government to concern with their own problems (Dolan 
1990; Reuben et al. 1982). Territorial consolidation is an approach that seeks to coalesce 
territorial units to improve a better use of services, avoiding opportunistic behaviours and 
free-riding strategies.  
A most common argument is the one that sustains that size and consolidation 
allow a better coordination and allocation of services that avoids duplicated efforts. And, 
at the same time, size allows to reduce average costs that make services financially 
sustainable, so it is argued that consolidation increased efficiency and economies of scale. 
Fragmentation allows the hypotheses of Politicians to perform rationally and 
pursue pork barrel project (Weingast et al. 1981). Politician can make decisions that grant 
a net profit to their jurisdiction while sharing the financial burden with the rest of the 
community. They act taking jurisdiction as a common pool resource were each one seeks 
approval for his district project, sharing with the rest of the added fiscal burden. As a 
consequence, all districts will choose the same strategy seeking short-term benefits 
ignoring long-term allocation inefficiencies and higher taxes (Ostrom 1990) (Feiock et al. 
2009; Bradbury & Stephenson 2003).  
Territorial consolidation reduces free-riding behaviour in the case of positive 
externalities. Size minimizes the risks of neighbor populations "invade" their territory in 
search of goods without having contributed to them (Elgie & McMenamin 2008).  
From the literature we can point out arguments to sustain a 
fragmentation/consolidation continuum. The fragmentation of the municipal jurisdiction 
in parishes can have one of the two implications: on the one hand, it can raise inter-local 
government competition and relieve municipal burden of financial support. On the other, 
increasing numbers of parishes can generate a situation of pork barrel decision associated 
with logrolling (Buchanan James & Tullock 1962; Macdonald 2008). 
Our first hypothesis has the purpose to test Tiebout’s argument that there is an 
optimal level of public expenditures linked with the territorial decentralization. We argue 
that low levels of fragmentation redraw competing initiative and increase budget and 
expenditures to a level higher than the optimal: 
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H1a: Higher levels of territorial fragmentation lead to higher local government 
public spending levels. 
On the other hand, excessive fragmentation can create inefficiency due to 
overlapping services and territory exiguity limitation to achieve economies of scale. So 
our hypothesis is: 
H1b: Higher levels of territorial fragmentation lead to lower local government 
public spending levels. 
From both hypotheses we can draw a general one that argues that there is an 
optimal level of fragmentation that minimizes public spending: 
H1: Territorial fragmentation has a U shape relation with public spending. 
 
Fiscal Fragmentation 
It is commonly accepted that the spectrum fragmentation/consolidation includes a fiscal 
perspective. Boyne (1992) and followed work of Hendrick, Jimenez and Lal (2011) 
relates that this dimension of local governments structure is associated with the 
distribution of responsibilities and public resources. In others words, it refers to the extent 
to which service delivery and other fiscal responsibilities are concentrated or dispersed. 
In a concentrated system, for example, most functions and public resources are located in 
a small number of authorities rather than widely dispersed (Boyne, 1992). In this case and 
according to the number of local government units, the responsibilities and public 
resources can be uniformly distributed among local governments or concentrated in a few 
units.  
 According to several works, fragmentation and dispersion can lead to greater 
competition among local governments through Tiebout’s (1956) fiscal exit mechanism. 
The existence of various local governments increases the information available to 
residents about the price and quality of public services and as governments are afraid of 
losing local taxpayers, the delivery of public services will be associated with lower 
spending and efficiency gains (Boyne, 1992; Dowding and Mergoupis, 2003; Hendrick, 
Jimenez e Lal, 2011). Giving these arguments, fragmentation and dispersion will reduce 
the size of local governments. 
 However, Gustely (1977), Hendrick, Jimenez and Lal (2011) and Schneider 
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(1986) pointed out that government’s fragmentation and dispersion have related fiscal 
problems. A fragmented and dispersed local government’s structure will be less efficient 
and more costly. Firstly, fragmentation increased the cost of government because 
economies of scale in the provision of local services were lost; Secondly, the overlapping 
local governments that exist in some systems lead to inefficiencies because of lost 
opportunities for the coordination of services to avoid duplication and overlap. Thirdly, 
various smaller governments in an area will create spillover effects in which the actions 
of one government will benefit or create costs for government nearby. All governments 
have an incentive to become free riders. Fourthly, citizen’s knowledge of the costs of 
government will be less accurate in systems with a higher number of overlapping 
governments. Thus, fragmentation leads to unnecessary growth of government through 
waste and inefficient organization and, consequently, increases the size of the local public 
sector (Hendrick, Jimenez and Lal (2011); Schneider, 1986). In this sense, an often-
suggested alternative to fragmented and dispersed system is governmental 
consolidation/concentration. In a fiscal perspective, consolidation should be associated 
with lower costs and greater efficiency, producing economies of scale (Boyne, 1992).  
In the Portuguese context, the fiscal responsibilities and public resources are 
distributed among all parishes, by financial grants provided by central government, 
considering the type of parishes. In this sense, we can enunciate a fiscal fragmentation 
hypothesis, arguing that a higher level of fragmentation into parishes leads to a higher 
level of size of local governments. Our second is:  
H2: Higher levels of fiscal fragmentation lead to higher local government public 
spending levels. 
Political Fragmentation 
Territorial fragmentation is directly associated with the number of existing local 
governments. It is obvious to see that as long as the fragmentation in a jurisdiction goes 
we will have higher levels of density of representation. This can be considered as a good 
outcome regarding the quality of local democracy. The multiplication of local 
governments can be understood as a way to improve representation, accountability and 
public participation (Bulut & Taniyici 2006).  
Political fragmentation has also been studied as a measure of governmental 
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fragmentation between majority and coalition situations (Elgie & McMenamin 2008). 
The weak government hypotheses stressed the importance of cohesion for municipal 
levels of spending (Elgie, 2008). The original hypotheses were mutated to test parliament 
versus government fragmentation and to analyze the effect issues such as debt and levels 
of expenditures (Hann and Sturm, 1997). Political fragmentation was also analyzed under 
the aim of how decision was spread across different actors (Crain & Muris 1995). In most 
of the situations a strong correlation is found between fragmentation and public 
expenditures or debt. 
At the local level, and in particular to this multi-level analysis, we seek to analyze 
the effect of political fragmentation in a new sense. In the Portuguese context, city 
council has mixed composition combining parish (freguesias) represent and at-large 
elected members.2. Since city council has the legal competence of budget approval it is 
expected to be a key player in the overall budgetary negotiation. One can argue that a 
more coherent political environment, where most of the parishes representative are from 
the same political party of the executive, can drive to less financial spending. However, it 
is important to notice that we are willing to establish a relation between the degree of 
fragmentation and the level of grants that municipalities guarantee to their parishes. Since 
these grants arenot mandatory, and reflect the level of trust between levels of local 
government, we can make an opposite argument. A political alignment hypothesis can be 
drawn stating that municipalities are willing to ensure more financial assistance to entities 
that share the same political ideology and, therefore, political alignment drives to a higher 
size of local government. So, our hypothesis is:  
  H3: Higher levels of political fragmentation lead to lower levels of local 
government spending 
 
DATA AND METHODS 
This research addresses to a main question then divided into three more specific. 
The first question is: do fragmentation explains the size of the local government? Then 
we specify our questions on how the territorial/fiscal/political fragmentation sustains the 
                                                            
2 Portuguese Law rules that in any case can the representatives of parishes out numb the at-large 
elected. 
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determination of the size of municipal spending. In order to answer these questions, we 
analyze data from 278 Portuguese municipalities and 4050 parishes3 on an attempt to 
verify a link between size, measured by financial grant given by municipalities to 
parishes, and levels of fragmentation. We expect to find a positive relation between fiscal 
fragmentation and the size of the local government and a negative one with political 
fragmentation. Additionally, we expect to find a U shaped relation between territorial 
fragmentation and the size of the local government. So, our model seeks to test, in 
Portuguese context, the Tiebout’s arguments that fragmentation improves efficiency 
through the use of a competitive mechanism. Additionally, since literature points out 
several approaches that deny the gains of a territorial fragmentation, we use a measure to 
find an optimal level of fragmentation that minimizes the local government expenditures.  
Our model can be represented by:  
 
Ln(MunicipalGrant) = ! (#Parishesper capita) +! (#Parishes per capita)2 
+ ! (HHIFinancial) + ! (Political Alingment) + ! (Net indebtedness) + φ"(Income per 
capita) + φ"(Urban Soil) + ! 
 
As a dependent variable we use the Ln(MunicipalGrant) as a proxy to the  size of 
the local government, considering that it represents the overall grants fixed by local 
government to their parishes. These grants are committed to parishes on two regular 
bases: One is the will of municipalities to voluntarily share some of the legal competence 
with their parishes. This process of decentralization is compelled to a financial grant to 
ensure the feasibility of the process. Another situation is when municipalities decide to 
grant financial funding to a parish in order to make specific investments that originally 
where confined to the municipal responsibility. Dealing with expenditures has a problem 
of potential endogeneity since levels of expenditures can be related to incrementalism, 
taking the former year a decision base (Macdonald 2008; Pettersson-Lidbom 2011). 
However, we believe that, since our dependent variable is a voluntary grant based on 
yearly decision, taken by municipalities, we have minimized the main endogeneity 
problems. 
                                                            
3 We use data only from continental Portugal 
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As independent variable we consider the three different kinds of fragmentation. 
For territorial fragmentation we use the number of parishes per 1,000 population (Berry 
2008; Craw 2008; Hendrick et al. 2011) and its square. This indicator allows us to 
measure the accurate degree of territorial fragmentation considering the level of 
population of each jurisdiction. Highly fragmented jurisdiction can be compensated by a 
larger population and have a low score on this fragmentation indicator. On the other 
hand, the same level of fragmentation with less population will score higher. We expect 
to find a U shape relation between fragmentation and the size of the government. Data 
were collected from the National Bureau for Local Government (direcção-geral das 
autarquias locais) and  National Bureau of Statistics (INE). 
Financial fragmentation is given by levels of fiscal fragmentation that is based on  
Hirschman-Herfindahl index (HHI). HHI is normally used in industrial context to 
measure the level of concentration of one market/industry. It gives you an idea of the 
level of competition of one firm in the market. It is obtained by the sum of the proportion 
of all units within a system squared.4. Then, in order to get the level of fragmentation, as 
Hendrick (2011) made, we subtracted the index from 1. So, the value of the index ranges 
from 1 (high fragmentation) to 0 (low fragmentation). Considering that parishes’ 
functions are listed exhaustively by central government and the accomplishment of those 
functions is provided by central government through financial grants that are distributed 
according to the type of parishes, we allocate the revenues of financing fund of parishes 
by each parish, contemplating the municipal jurisdiction. The argument is that higher 
level of fiscal fragmentation into parishes will increase the level of local governments 
public spending. As the financial grants are based on an established rule, the larger the 
number of parishes, the greater the size of local governments. Data were collected from 
the National Bureau for Local Government (direcção-geral das autarquias locais). 
Political fragmentation was measured by the relative weight of parishes that 
belong to a different party of the municipalities over the overall number of parishes in 
that jurisdiction. The argument is that the higher the level of fragmentation, the weaker 
the political alignment will be. Being built on a voluntary basis, municipal grants can 
increase as fragmentation is lower, since municipalities tend to overlook  their own 
                                                            
4 !!!!! 2 
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parishes. 
Our control variables are the net debt, income and urbanization rate. Net 
indebtedness is obtained by subtracting the assets to the liabilities of the municipality. It 
allows us to control the effect, in municipal grants, of the overall financial situation of 
each municipality. It is expected that in situations of higher debt, municipalities will tend 
to decrease the level of grants. Data were collected from the National Bureau for Local 
Government (direcção-geral das autarquias locais) and National Bureau of Statistics 
(INE). Per capita income is a measure that allows us to control the wealth of a 
community. Itis expect that wealthier jurisdictions are more willing to share more funds 
with parishes since their marginal costs are close to zero. Finally, urbanization rate serves 
the purpose to control the need of population for more urban infrastructures (%urban). 
Data for population and income, population and urbanization rate were gathered by the 
National Bureau of Statistics (INE). 
[Table 1 here] 
Ordinary least squares (OLS) regression is employed to estimate the models using 
the grants conceded from municipalities to parishes (natural logarithm) as the dependent 
variable. Results of OLS regressions are presented on table 2: 
[Table 2 here] 
 
EMPIRICAL FINDINGS 
 The overall results confirm the idea that there is a close relation between 
fragmentation, both territorial and fiscal, and the size of local government grants. Results 
show evidence of an optimal level of fragmentation that minimizes the size of municipal 
spending with parishes. The model in table 2 stands for the determinants of the size of 
municipal grants estimated with OLS regression. The explanatory power of our estimated 
models is close to explain 30% of the variation in the dependent variable. Every variable 
display consistent results to our hypotheses and most of them have statistical 
significance. One of the variables that miss statistical significance is the political 
alignment which was appointed to be one of the determinants of fragmentation.  
Results indicate that territorial fragmentation has a relevant impact on the size of 
municipal grants. Controlling for marginal effects of the community financial context and 
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welfare, results show evidence of a U shaped behavior between municipal grant and   
territorial fragmentation. Low fragmentation cannot  promote competition or represent 
accurately the constituents’ preferences. Oligopolistic situation falls under x-inefficiency 
failure where operating costs are higher than necessary.  Increasing number of parishes 
will lead to competitive behavior between parishes to perform better than its “neighbor”. 
However, too much fragmentation makes it difficult to avoid overlapping cost and 
inefficient spending. Minimal level of expenditures is reached when we have close to 2, 
10 parishes for 1,000 inhabitants. Almost 89% of municipalities are less fragmented than 
the optimal size determined. Average number of parishes for 1,000 inhabitants is up to 1, 
47 parishes, under the expected number to reach optimal level. 
Fiscal fragmentation also displays a result that complies with our hypothesis. 
Present funding rules impose a financial scarcity to parishes, in highly fragmented 
municipal jurisdiction. Parish national grants (Fundo Financiamento para as Freguesias 
– FFF) are determined by a relative amount redrawn from national taxes. The overall 
amount of the grant depends on the amount collected by the state and never by the 
number of parishes. Despite some particular decisions, once we fixed the amount to 
transfer to parishes it is obvious that increasing number of parishes will ultimately lead to 
less funding distribution. As a consequence, results tell us that it is expected a higher 
level of municipal spending. 
Political fragmentation, despite  having the expected sign, showing evidences that 
political affiliation to the same party will increase the size of municipal grants, misses 
statistical significance.      
 All control variables display the excepted sign even though  only per capita 
income has statistical significance. As expected, more and wealthier population will 
increase median voter standards making local government more willing to increase 
expenditures (Downs 1957).  
 
CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY IMPLICATION 
 This paper aimed to make two core contributions to the literature. One is that it 
analyzes the fragmentation issue under three different dimensions: territorial, fiscal and 
political. By doing this, the paper highlights the necessity of a correct balance between 
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institutions and levels of government, wich is the other contribution. One factor to 
municipal spending is the grants allowed to parishes, if we are looking forward to control 
expenditures we need to have a coherent set of institutional agreement on 
fragmentation/consolidation, in order to avoid that on set can overrule the others.  
 In our analysis we can see that although territorial fragmentation contributes to 
less expenditure, fiscal fragmentation has an opposite effect. The fragmentation of a 
municipal jurisdiction into several parishes denotes a sense of competitive trend between 
local governments. Results tell us that a certain level of fragmentation can be obtained in 
a way that it can improve sustainability. However, financial rules undermine what 
territorial fragmentation is doing. We can point out that some improvements need to be 
done in financial institutions. Seizing the upper hand of a competitive context, funding 
mechanism could be updated to improve financial autonomy of parishes, otherwise they 
will keep depending on municipalities to achieve their goals.  
The IMF/EU/ECB understanding took a different approach. They bet on territorial 
fragmentation which, though ignoring competitive context of territorial fragmentation, 
achieved a reduction on the size of municipalities expenditures based on grants allowed 
to lower levels of administration.  
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Table 1. Descriptive Statistics 
 
 
 
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Dependent      
Municipal Grants (ln) 274     12.28308     2.679204           0    16.99016 
Independent      
Territorial Fragmentation 278     .8866186    .8062606    .0316446    4.237288 
Territorial Fragmentation (sq) 278      1.43381     2.552815    .0010014    17.95461 
Fiscal Fragmentation 277     .8324952     .1659741           0    .9876594 
Political alignment  278  .4817134    .2903415           0           1 
Control      
Income (per capita) 278     -2.13e+07     5.45e+07   -8.33e+08    1.06e+07 
% Urbanization 272     .113446     .1327556    .0034547    .7877215 
Net Debt (per capita) 278     806.3547     146.2044    582.9102    1667.018 
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Table 2. Ordinary Least Squares Regression (dependent variable: Capital expenditures (Ln)) 
 Municipal Grants (ln) 
Independent 
Coefficient 
(RSE) 
Territorial Fragmentation 
-2.11258***   
(.5325493) 
Territorial Fragmentation (sq) 
  .5024328***   
(.1340775)  
Fiscal Fragmentation 
7.181792***   
(1.337536) 
Political Alignment  
.7610488   
(.6050487) 
Control  
Income (per capita) 
.003864***  
  (.0012005) 
% Urbanization 
.6254302   
(.8241307) 
Net Indebtedness 
-1.73e-09    
(1.78e-09) 
Const 
3.716199**  
(1.795979) 
Obs 267 
F (7,259) 16.02 
Prob>F .000 
R2 .2777 
   *p<.10; **p<.05; ***p<.01; two-tailed tests. Robust standard errors. 
